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The Existential Nature of Human Learning:
Toward a Philosophical Understanding of Learning
Peter Jarvis
University of Surrey, UK
Abstract: Human learning occurs within our experience of the wider world.
Consequently, it is necessary to understand both the concept of experience and
something of the nature of the person who experiences it. This paper explores
both seeking to relate them to wider theories of learning, and culminates in a new
definition of learning itself.
Learning is an ambiguous concept that is being used as both process and product, i.e. the
processes of human learning, and lifelong learning is replacing the term lifelong education. This
paper focuses upon the former. But there are a multitude of different theories of human learning
(see Jarvis, Holford and Griffin, 2003) although learning itself is a human phenomenon. Each
theory may explain some aspect of human learning but since they differ so widely they are each
incomplete. Moreover, each is grounded in an often unwritten, and maybe unacknowledged,
philosophy of the human being – even a philosophy of human learning. This latter aspect has
been sadly neglected by most of us who have written about learning, with the notable exception
of Winch (1998) and, to a lesser extent, by my own Paradoxes of Learning (Jarvis, 1992).
While I do not want to discuss in depth this wide variety of theories, reference will be
made to some of them in this paper, it is significant that in recent years considerable emphasis
has been placed upon experiential, including practice-based and problem-based, learning. This
has been for several reasons: as a teaching method is has helped overcome the notorious theorypractice gap (see also Jarvis, 1999); it reflects the tenor of the age and has a long and respectable
pedigree in thinkers such as Dewey and Lewin. It was popularised by Kolb in a rather oversimple manner – perhaps it was the simplicity of his cycle and the time at which he wrote that
made it popular. Nevertheless, it was Locke and later Kant, among many others, who argued
many years earlier that all knowledge comes from personal experience. Surprisingly, however,
the concept of experience has been left un-discussed by most of the exponents of experiential
learning, which Oakeshott (1933) describes as one of the most difficult concepts in the
philosophical vocabulary. Once we begin to examine the problems underlying ‘experience’ we
are confronted with yet another perennial philosophical problem – that of the relationship of the
body to the mind. In this paper I want to enter briefly into both of these debates and show their
relevance to learning theory by demonstrating that once we have embarked upon this enterprise
we can see both the strengths and weaknesses of some of the other theories of learning.
Part 1 The Nature of Experience
Among Descartes’ central tenets was the need to prove our own existence by thought, i.e. I
think therefore I am. But I know that I exist: I know I am, and I do not need to prove it to myself.
Because I am, I think! Marquarrie (1973,p.125) writes:
But what does it mean to say, ‘I am’? ‘I am’ is the same as ‘I exist’; but ‘I exist’, in
turn, is equivalent to ‘I-am-in-the-world’, or again ‘I-am-with-others’. So the premise of
the argument is not anything so abstract as ‘I think’ or even ‘I am’ if it is understood in
some isolated sense. The premise is the immediately rich and complex reality, ‘I-amwith-others-in the world’.
But we also know that we are in the world because we act, as MacMurray (1961,p.17) argued,
‘We know existence by participating in existence’. I am, therefore, I act, but also I act, therefore,

I am. Being, and therefore becoming, lie at the heart of our thinking about learning – but
thinking per se is but one element in it. Thinking is a function of our existence and not proof of
it. Being in the world means that we have to experience it and so it is necessary to understand
what experiencing it means. I want to suggest four ways by which we can understand this
concept - consciousness, biography, episode and sensation:
Consciousness – the ability to be able to ‘know’ the world: Chalmers (1996, p.3) opens his book
The Conscious Mind thus: ‘Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world
and the most mysterious’. He goes on to argue, quite convincingly, that there are two forms of
consciousness – a phenomenological and a psychological. The former is about ‘what is means…
to feel a certain way’ and the latter, ‘what it means…for it to play an appropriate causal role’
(p.12). Clearly in some of the more recent studies recognising the emotional, educationalists are
beginning to recognise the difference between the two. Chalmers suggests some forms of
phenomenological experience, such as emotions, sense of self, and pain (pp.8-11); he also
indicates some forms of psychological experience, such as awakeness, introspection and
knowledge (pp.26-27). Consequently, he offers two definitions of conscious experience:
Phenomenological: the concept of mind as conscious experience and as a mental state as
a consciously experienced mental state;
Psychological: the concept of mind as a causal or explanatory basis for behaviour (p.11).
Biography - the outcome of a lifetime: Experience is seamless and relates fundamentally to my
conscious awareness of the external world throughout my lifetime. Oakeshott (1933, p10) wrote:
…the view that I propose to maintain is that experience is a single whole, within which
modifications may be distinguished, but which admits to no final or absolute division;
and that experience everywhere, not merely is inseparable from thought, but is itself a
form of thought.
The seemlessness is a view shared by other thinkers (Dewey, Schutz, inter alia). But for
Oakeshott experience is subjective and cognitive. He argued that experiencing is always a ‘world
of ideas’. He assumed that experience is entirely cognitive whereas we are suggesting that the
person is more complex. When we act upon the external world, we are also thinking and feeling
about it – we might know how to do a thing and also have the ability to do it (practical
knowledge), but we also usually have feelings about it, which may actually be a significant
motivation to act. We also are aware, for instance, that sports people train their bodies and
musicians their arms and fingers to act in an almost instinctive manner. Consequently, the body
acts, sometimes apparently almost without the mind, or in response to an external stimulus, so
that experience is more than just the ideas – it is cognitive, emotive and physical.
Episode – the moment of contact with the world: In an episodic experience we have may be a
direct encounter with the external world or it may be mediated to us. However, the significant
point is that at this moment we become conscious and aware of the external world – which I
have called disjuncture – when my biography and my interpretation of the immediate world are
not in harmony and I am forced to ask questions – why? how?, and so on. We can experience
that world through our senses and interpret the sensations that we are having, which is a primary
experience. However, most of our experiences of the external world are mediated: we are told
about a phenomenon, we see pictures on the television and we are taught theoretical ideas by
teachers although we have not had the opportunity of experiencing these for ourselves – they are
secondary experiences. Much of what we learn comes from secondary experience and much of

what we are taught in college or university, often called theory, is also secondary experience –
they are the interpreted experiences of others that are transmitted to us, about which we need to
be critical. The process of providing secondary experiences is what Knowles called pedagogy
and, for many educators, this is insufficient and so they provide primary experiences, through
role play, simulation, and so on, in order that the learners experience cognitively, physically and
emotionally. It is this provision of primary experiences that has come to be known as
experiential teaching and learning. Experiential learning, in this limited sense, is also existential
but all existential learning would not be considered experiential.
Sensation – the ability to be able to ‘sense’ the world: We all have our basic senses from which
we are able to learn about the world: hearing; seeing; smelling; tasting; touching and feeling. In
the final category, or two categories, we can begin to see the problem that we had with the
phenomenological and the psychological since touching and feeling are profoundly different. But
the first five also give rise to an interesting issue, e.g. when we hear something it sets off
sensations in the ear that are transmitted to the brain – as impulses, but how do these impulses
acquire meaning since they have no meaning in themselves for words are arbitrary symbols. The
same might be asked of the sensations transmitted by our eyes, our nose, our taste buds and the
nerves at our finger tips, and so on. We have to learn them in our childhood, so that our
meanings reflect our culture – but we can see immediately that the external world we appear to
experience is not the immediate cause of the meaning that we put it – there is a correlation
between the two but not a causal relationship. Therefore, our experience of whatever it is, is
always socially constructed.
We have now examined four different ways of understanding the concept of experience – each of
which is relevant to our understanding of learning. In our relationship with the external world,
we are at specific moments conscious, and aware, of it and are recipients of sensations about it
which are frequently associated with previous learning experiences which may be cognitive,
attitudinal, skills based, belief-based, ethical or new sensations. In our learning these
experiences are transformed through cognitive, emotive or behavioural processes and integrated
into our biographies. But our understanding of these processes is dependent upon our
understanding of the body-mind relationship since the sensations are physical and the biography
is mental and also a combination of the psychological and the phenomenological.
Part 2 The Mind-Body Relationship
From the earliest philosophical studies the relationship between the body and the mind
has constituted a problem that, although rarely discussed in the literature on human learning, has
influenced the way that some scholars have understood it. There is no agreement between
scholars about the nature of this relationship and Maslin (2001) suggests five main theories:
dualism; mind/brain identity; logical or analytical behaviourism; functionalism; non-reductive
monism.
Dualism: By rejecting Descartes’ well known dictum, ‘I think, therefore I am’ but we did not
thereby reject the classical dualist position which states that the human person is a composite of
two completely separate entities: body and mind. However, we will reject the more extreme
dualist position that start from the assumption that mind is not dependent upon the body since
there are a number of problems with dualism such as the existence of the brain itself since it is
hard to claim that an action and a thought about it are separate phenomena. They are con-joint in

some way, and there may be correlation of the meaning in the mind with the activity in the brain
rather than a causal relationship. In addition, it is clear that when we act it is our body as well as
our mind that performs in unison rather than each act being two distinct elements – the thought
and the action. Yet we have already argued that there is some kind of dualism of body and mind
when it comes to sensations and experiences, and we will return to this below. In addition, we
know that learning is a complex human phenomenon.
Mind/brain identity: This is a monist theory that claims that only physical substances exist and
that human beings are just part of the material world and, therefore, mental states are identical
with physical ones. This raises fundamental problems about the nature of culture and meaning.
But, we know, for instance, that when we think brain scans reveal increased neuron activity;
Greenfield (1999, p.124) writes:
...there is no magic ingredient for consciousness....the issue is a quantitative one,
depending on the degree of recruitment of neurons: the extent of recruitment will
determine your consciousness at any one time...
This is a reductionist position but one which points us towards an understanding of learning a
little better since it helps us understand how the brain operates and, therefore, something more of
the mechanism of thinking (see Jarvis and Parker, 2005). Incidentally, if we can affect the
functioning of the brain, we can affect the way that we think, and so we do need to develop a
pharmacology of learning.
Nevertheless, being able to locate where a thought is occurring in the brain does not explain the
meaning we give to it, any intentions or plans resulting from it, or even rationality itself. Indeed,
thoughts are different in type from neurological activity and it is culture rather than biology that
shapes the meaning of human life, although I would not claim that biology has no influence at
all. Maslin also raises other difficulties but these are sufficient to demonstrate that while the
theory has certain attractions, it also leaves many questions unanswered.
Behaviourism: A great deal of theory and policy about learning has been couched in
behaviourist terms ever since the time of Pavlov. Maslin (2001,p.106) summarises the position
thus: ‘behaviourism maintains that statements about the mind and mental states turn out, after
analysis, to be statements that describe a person’s actual and potential public behaviour’. Indeed,
we have already seen the claim ‘I act, therefore, I am’ – and this can, in some circumstances, be
regarded as a behaviourist statement. Behaviourism does explain some of the outcomes of the
learning process and these can be measured, so that in an age where quantification is important,
it is not surprising that behaviourism retains its attractions. Nevertheless, there are major
problems with it, such as whether behaviour is the driving force of human being or whether there
are other forces, such as meaning, emotion or even thought itself. It seems to me that none of the
objections to the mind/brain identity theory are overcome by postulating that everything can be
reduced to behaviour. Indeed, behaviourism is weak since it also denies the common sense
assumption that I can actually think my own thoughts and do not have to reveal them to
anybody. To put it crudely, a good poker player could hardly be a convincing behaviourist.
While behaviourism can point to the outcomes of the learning processes, it is incapable of
explaining the processes themselves.
Functionalism: This approach regards the mind as a function of the brain, so that if we can
understand all the inputs and outputs and also the state of operating mechanism, we account for

our understanding of mental states. In other words, the brain is seen as a super-computer. This
theory has gained a great deal of currency recently and because of the analogy with the computer
appears credible, especially now that we can also talk of artificial intelligence. But we might ask
– is the human being no more than a sophisticated computer – especially one that has been
programmed to ‘think’? If we were to accept this, then the human being is de-personalised and
learning reduced to a computer program. But we know that thoughts have meaning and intention
– something that a computer program performing its functions cannot have. Not only this, but
computers are thoroughly rational machines and they cannot deviate from their programmed
logic, but human beings are not totally rational! It was a computer specialist who invented the
term ‘fuzzy logic’ to describe the way that we behave in contrast to the way computers function.
In my own research into superstition many years ago, I discovered that all my respondents were
in some way or another superstitious, or less that rational in their behaviour (Jarvis, 1980).
Freudian psychology also points us beyond the bounds of rationality. Indeed, computers cannot
have phenomenological experiences. Maslin raises a number of other objections and, despite the
popularity of the analogy, this theory is not at all convincing.
Non-reductive monism: This theory is also dualistic in terms of properties but not substances.
Maslin (12001, p. 163) describes it thus:
It is non-reductive because it does not insist that mental properties are nothing over and
above physical properties. On the contrary, it is willing to allow that mental properties
are different in kind from physical properties, and not ontologically reducible to them. It
is clusters and series of these mental properties which constitute our psychological
lives...property dualism dispenses with the dualism of substances and physical events,
hence it is a form of monism. But these physical substances and events possess two
very different kinds of property, namely physical properties and, in addition, nonphysical, mental properties.
The relationship between the physical and mental properties might be described in terms of
supervenience, which is ‘the idea that one set of facts can fully determine another set’ (Chalmers
(1996, p.32), which, according to Maslin, has three elements: irreducibility, co-variation and
dependency. Chalmers also makes the crucial distinction between logical and natural
supervenience. A problem, then, with mental properties is that they cannot be located like
physical substances – that is by definition they are not physical and so even the processes that
can be seen in brain scans are not revealing the content of the thoughts. Consequently, Chalmers,
argues that consciousness per se cannot be logically reduced to a physical condition, that is, it is
not logically supervenient on the material, even though the mind is dependent on the biological
brain. Hence we are left with a complex position: while the mind is dependent on the brain the
mental and especially the phenomenological experiences we have are not reducible to the
physical. He has, therefore ruled out the most common approach, as have others m e.g. Bergson.
Having examined five different ways of looking at the mind-body relationship we can
find no simple theory that allows us to explain it. Exclusive claims should not logically be made
for any single theory, although we find these being made quite widely. Some of the theories,
however, appear much weaker than others, such as mind/brain identity, behaviourism and
functionalism, which is unfortunate since these are the ones most widely cited in contemporary
society. We have accepted a form of dualism that may best be explained in the form of nonreductive monism, although we are less happy with dualism per se. The human being is both
physical and mental. The mind-body relationship remains an unanswered problem, so that in all
our theorising

about human learning we might never ever be able to explain the process at its most fundamental
level. At the same time, we are conscious that some form of dualism, or non-reductive monism,
is necessary if we are to account for the richness of human learning – but in so doing we can see
the weakness in some of the widely held theories of learning.
Part 3 Concluding Discussion
Ormrod (1995,p.5) alludes to the mind/body problem when she offers two definitions of
learning: a relatively permanent change in behaviour, or a relatively permanent change in mental
associations, both due to experience. In both definitions learning is seen as a product of
experience but learning is fundamentally a human process, and this cannot logically be the same
as the product. In addition, the fact that she holds these two aspects of mind and body apart
demonstrates that there is fundamental weakness in those theories that emphasize behaviour to
the exclusion of the cognitive, and vice versa. In both the experience is also the precursor to
learning rather than a fundamental element in the learning itself.
In addition, information processing theory sees the brain as a computer, which we have
also called into question, and it does not enter into the intricacies of the debate about the mind.
Even Kolb’s experiential learning cycle does not explore the conceptual questions about the
nature of experience or the person who learns and so it is also an insufficient explanation of
learning.
Now all of these traditional theories have been shown to be valid within the limits of their
own claims but because of the complexity of the learning process few of them have begun to
offer a comprehensive understanding of human learning. As a result of these discussions we can
now offer a definition of human learning as a combination of processes whereby the whole
person – body (genetic, physical and biological) and mind (knowledge, skills, attitudes, values,
emotions, beliefs and senses) – experiences a social situation, the content of which is then
transformed cognitively, emotively or practically (or through any combination) and integrated
into the person’s individual biography resulting in a changed (or more experienced) person.
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